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ABSTRACT
This study was a pre-phase A study initiated under NASA contract by JPL
to investigate the safety implications of Space Shuttle launched spacecraft
that use liquid fluorine as the oxidizer for spacecraft propulsion.
The reference spacecraft, for study purposes, was similar to a MJS 71*
Mariner in configuration.
Fluorine based retropropulsion will be needed in the future to effectively
conduct a number of planetary orbiter missions particularly those to outer
planets. Technically, the concern for Space Shuttle launched spacecraft
consists of safely loading, transporting and carrying into space a tank contain-
ing typically 1000 pounds of liquid fluorine which is a cryogenic, toxic, and
potentially corrosive fluid.
Feasibility of safe operation was investigated and the equipment and
procedures necessary to maximize the chance of success determined. Hazards to
the Shuttle were found to be similar in kind if not degree to those encountered
in use of nitrogen tetroxide (also a toxic oxidizer). It was concluded that
residual risks from spacecraft using fluorine and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizers
during ground and flight handling may be reduced by isolation of the oxidizer
to only its tank. Operation of planetary spacecraft propulsion in the vicinity
of the Shuttle in earth orbit is not required. Proper recognition of the
characteristics of both of these oxidizers must be given in spacecraft design
and in ground and flight operations. Safety precautions appropriate to payloads
carried in manned vehicles were developed in the study.
The primary hazard to personnel was identified as propellant loading
operations which are very similar in nature to routine transfers from the truck
trailers used during delivery of fluorine to industrial users. These operations
should be accomplished in an area reasonably remote from personnel and .facilities
concentrations.
Transportation and installation of the loaded propulsion system involve
hazards second only to loading propellant where great care must be exercised.
Clearing the pad during spacecraft mating with the Shuttle Orbiter is recommended.
4 #
*Mariner Jupiter Saturn designated for launch in 1977
i
The considerations relating to transport of the spacecraft bipropellant
propulsion systems considered here have much in common with carrying of other
propulsive payloads such as monopropellant hydrazine systems, and the OHS kits
which utilize N204/MMH. The selection of solid propellant for the IUS would
appear to eliminate the hazard of propellant leakage from the IUS.
Residual hazards during flight in the Shuttle cargo bay from a propulsion
system which has been subjected to propellant loading, storage, transportation
and installation in the Orbiter appear low.. It is important, however, that
hazards to the propulsion system from the failure of other systems also in the
cargo bay are minimized.
To maximize the probability of success, basic work should be continued and
expanded with goals delineated to be matched against specific criteria.
FOREWORD
The principal purpose of this study was to ascertain the more im-
portant effects on the Space Transportation System (STS) when liquid
fluorine (LF2 ) is transported on the STS as part of a Shuttle-launched
spacecraft. The study might best be categorized as a pre-Phase A study.
Planetary orbiters will probably require bipropellant systems, so it
was clearly desirable to study the effects attendant with a space-
storable propellant such as LF 2
 as compared to an earth-storable propel-
lant. The oxidizer selected for comparison with fluorine was nitrogen
tetroxide (N 204), because it is an acceptable oxidizer for transport on
the Shuttle.
The second purpose was to evaluate; on the basis of these effects,
the feasibility of carrying fluorine as part of a Shuttle payload. There
is always a risk to Shuttle from carrying any oxidizer or high pressure
gas. The basis.for judgment was whether or not the risks associated with
a propulsion system containing fluorine could be reduced to the level of
one containing N 204 . The comparison method (LF2
 versus N204 ) was used
throughout the study to give it the proper perspective since some type
of oxidizer is normally required for the propulsion system of a planetary
orbiter spacecraft.
The study begins with the loading of the spacecraft propulsion
system at ETR and concludes with deployment of the IUS/Tug, and it also
considers Shuttle abort modes.
The scope of the present study tended to broaden as it progressed,
and the initially budgeted effort was not large enough to examine a
number of interesting areas. The question of whether or not to dump
propellant in case of abort, for example, could not be resolved within
the resources available, so an arbitrary choice to assume dump would be
required was made for purposes of conservatism in continuing the study.
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The uncertainty surrounding the selection of the Interim Upper Stage
until just before the study ended precluded an evaluation of some
of the effects on that vehicle. Thus, the emphasis is on interfaces
between the Shuttle Orbiter and the spacecraft propulsion system, with
a dump provision conservatively assumed.
To answer the question, "What is required to prove that fluorine
can safely be used as an oxidizer in Shuttle-launched spacecraft?"
requires that specific and detailed configuration of spacecraft, IUS/
Tug and Orbiter be known. The present study necessarily addresses this
question from a more general point of view. No unique technical problems
were found that could not be resolved.
In view of this result, it is concluded that with proper design of
flight and ground support hardware, adequate test and operations pro-
cedures, and thorough training of personnel, the hazards associated with
fluorine can be reduced to a level equivalent to that of nitrogen
tetroxi de.
A. N. Williams
Liquid Propulsion Section
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
D. L. Young
Liquid Propulsion Section
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle or Space Transportation System (STS) will introduce
a new era in transportation, the era of routine flights and operations on
orbit. Now that the capabilities of t`e STS are known, potential users
such as the spacecraft community are investigating how best to utilize
then: capabilities.
suave exploration missions which involve orbiting of Mariner class
spacecraft around the outer planets are of great interest. Representative
spacecraft for these missions are shown in Figures 1-1 through 1-3.
Figure 1-2 illustrates the flight configuration spacecraft as it is con-
ceived with earth storable propellants and in the deployed configuration.
In order to accomplish several of these missions using the Shuttle
Upper Stage, (SUS) and with reasonable flight times, it has been found
most effective to utilize the high level of planetary retro-propulsion
performance that can only be obtained with fluorine or fluorine containing
oxidizers.
With space storable propellants (liquid fluorine and hydrazine) a
configuration similar to that above is anticipated, however space storage
of the fluorine will require an adequate "view" from the fluorine tank to
space which may require some outward repositioning of the fluorine tank.
Fi gure 1-3 illustrates the sage spacecraft in the undeployed configuration
with a disposable outer shroud or fairing. During transport, the fluorine
is kept cool by liquid nitrogen from a dewar or, for limited periods, its
own thermal inertia. The reference spacecraft is similar to that antici-
pated for a MJS 77* Mariner in configuration.
*Mariner-Jupiter designated for launch in 1977.
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The technical concerns which led to this study were the safety
questions associated with a Space Shuttle launched spacecraft involving
propellant loading, transporting and carrying into space in a manned
vehicle a tank containing typically 1000 pounds of liquid fluorine which
is a cryogenic, toxic, and potentially corrosive fluid. Schematic dia-
grams of a current nitrogen tetroxide/monomethyl hydrazine (N204/MMH)
propulsion system and a conceptual fluorine/hydrazine (F 2/N 2H4) propulsion
system are shown in Figures 1-4 and 1-5.
This pre-phase A study was needed since the tractability (suitability
and acceptability) of fluorine as a cargo in the Space Shuttle was not
known. Of prime interest in the study were safety aspects, as they con-
strain spacecraft design, and might affect the design of interfacing
systems including shroud, tug and orbiter. Processing sequence and
storage in the Shuttle of liquid fluorine, as compared to nitrogen tetr-
oxide, also required clarification.
The basic objectives of this investigation, therefore, were to high-
light safety implications resulting from a study of ground and flight
operations; that is, to assess the unique crew and Shuttle hardware safety
implications which would result from fluorine/hydrazine, LF 2/N2H4 , propel-
lants as compared to the earth storable combination nitrogen tetroxide*/
monomethyl hydrazine, N 204/MMH. These safety implications and the corres-
ponding recommended design requirements include those imposed on the space-
craft, the Space Shuttle, ground support equipment, and during both ground
and flight operations.
To accomplish these objectives, it was desirable to assess the rela-
tive risks of liquid fluorine, LF2 , as compared to nitrogen tetroxide for
application to planetary spacecraft propulsion launched in the Space Trans-
portation System, and to outline how existing knowledge could be applied to
the design of planetary spacecraft propulsion systems to maximize the assur-
ance of safe transportation of fluorine as cargo in the Space Shuttle.
*Also called dinitrogen tetroxide
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Experience in handling large quantities of fluorine has shown that
with suitable design and attention to detail that safe operations can be
realized on a day-to-day basis. As an example, liquid fluorine transpor-
tation in 5,000 lb. capacity truck trailer-mounted Dewars is carried out
routinely with a high level of safety and reliability.
There exists a large technology base with fluorine in the chemical
industry and a considerable and growing experience in rocket testing, al-
though no propulsion system using fluorine has yet flown (although a small
container of fluorine was launched from Wallops Island). Numerous pro-
grams have been sponsored by NASA involving many aspects of fluorine
rocketry. The Department of Defense has also sponsored extensive work in
fluorine rocketry. Although some incidents have occurred on some of these
programs, techniques have been developed to overcome the difficulties. At
TRW alone, over 2000 tests of fluorine combustion devices have been con-
ducted over the last eight years.
-8-
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2.	 SCOPE AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 SR e
In this summary, only the most pertinent findings of the study will be
discussed. Much more detail, of course, is contained in the main text in
Volume i.
The scope of this pre-phase A study was intended to be an overview
aimed at identifying the major considerations. The study, was limited by
funding and by the preliminary nature of the Space Shuttle and Tug design,
payload processing options, and plans for launch complex facilities.
Definition inn some of these areas, however, evolved significantly during
the course of the study.
It was the purpose of this study to compare crew and Shuttle hardware
safety interfaces which would result from the use of candidate earth stor-
able and space storable (such as F2/N2H4 ) propulsion systems including
those of the spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground support and on-ground and
flight operations.
From a technical standpoint two propellant systems were compared.
One is the fluorine/hydrazine combination. The other is the well known
nitrogen tetroxide/monomethyl -hydrazine combination used on the Shuttle
Orbit maneuvering system. In either case the oxidizer weight did not
exceed 3000 pounds.* Both blowdown and externally regulated pressuriza-
tion systems were considered.
It was assumed that launches will be from KSC using the Space Shuttle
(STS) as the carrier with its payload a Mariner spacecraft and SUS. The
NASA designated SUS (also called IUS/TUG in this report) is assumed to be
used to accelerate the Mariner spacecraft towards the vicinity of the
target planet.
*This corresponds to 5000 lbs of total propellant weight which is as much
as is ever required by a Shuttle launched planetary orbiter.
-9-
Emphasis was placed on both hazard identification and design solu-
tions to minimize or eliminate credible hazards.*
In performing this study, TRW drew on the results of a number of
previous and concurrent studies that involve the use of F 2/N 2H4 in
advanced space propulsion systems and other experience in the use of F2
as oxidizer at TRW's test facility. Safety aspects of handling liquid
fluorine in preflight and flight operations or in a ground-based test
facility are closely related. Since there is not as yet any experience
with Space Shuttle launched spacecraft propulsion, it was necessary
first to identify procedures for earth storable N 204/MMH propellants.
After completion of each of the study tasks considering earth
storable propellants, the study program tasks were completed for space
storable propellant to clearly specify how and why the use of the space
storable propellants might change the safety study results.
The study utilized system safety engineering methodology to investi-
gate potential hazards and system design engineering to define how exist-
ing technology could be used to provide safe operations.
Due to the value of the Shuttle and its facilities and the manned
aspects of Shuttle Orbiter operations, which may have their only precedent
in the Apollo program, significant safety precautions are required. In
response to this need, compromises of the spacecraft propulsion to achieve
increased safety have been considered which appear to be acceptable in
terms of performance and cost.
*i.e., one which might reasonably exist or occur.
-10-
This study was accomplished in two phases. During the first phase
the twelve tasks of the work statement were addressed. Participation and
review of this study by NASA Headquarters, JSC, MSFC, KSC and LRC was
accomplished by several trips and numerous telephone calls and by mail
communications. As the program progressed in the second phase the alter-
native design concepts and trade-offs involved in safe transport of a
loaded spacecraft in the Space Shuttle emerged.
Concepts for transport of earth storable N,0 4/MMH tended to follow
the approaches being evolved for 1) use of earth storable (Transtage or
Agena derivative) IUS concepts, 2) the OMS kits and 3) hydrazine RCS
systems on proposed earth orbital spacecraft. Concepts for transport of
the space storable (cryogenic) LF 2/N 2H4 system evolved from 1) the earth
storable concepts, 2) previous studies for expendable booster launched,
LF2 based, upper stage propulsion and 3) concepts for cryogenic LO2/LF2
IUS or Tug designs.* As the study progressed there was an on-going
evolution of the Shuttle payload accommodations, requirements and criteria.
The IUS and Tug concepts also continued to evolve. The structure of the
study as it was accomplished can be summarized by nine elements:
1. Accumulated design concepts, requirements and criteria.
2. Established study format based on system safety engineering
techniques.
3. Compared safety parameters
4. Conducted hazard analysis
5. proposed design concepts, processing sequences and procedures
to elimtnate or mitigate hazards
6. Evaluated alternate concepts and selected those most promising
1. Documented results
8. Reviewed with sponsoring angency
9. Refined the results and determined recommended follow-on work
*The decision to use solid propellant for the IUS came at the end of the
study.
i
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2.2 Conclusions
In the rest of this volume, the overall results of this study arE
summarized by main topics of interest including.
-	 Effect of fluorine as compared to N 204 on KSC operations
-	 Effect of fluorine as compared to N 204 on ETR operations
Effect of fluorine as compared to N 204 on Shuttle Post Launch
operations
Effect of fluorine as compared to N 204
 on the Shuttle Orbiter
and the Shuttle Upper Stage
-	 Effect of fluorine as compared to N 204 on Spacecraft Propulsion
System design
-	 Safety conditions for LF2 as compared to N204
-	 Conclusions and recommendations
In Sections 3 and 4 of Volume I, the technical background for the use
of fluorine and the detailed exposition of the original twelve tasks of
the study are described. The appendices of Volume I include important
data as to the JPL design concept, glossary of terms and launch site and
flight hazard analyses.
This study was limited to some degree by the unavailability of
detailed information about the Shuttle Orbiter as no description of propel-
lant dump accommodations or their design criteria for the Orbiter was
available. Also, only limited data on the Payload Changeout Facility was
available. Some data became available too late for inclusion in this
report.
4
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3. SAFETY PARAMETER COMPARISON OF LF2
 VS N204
Comparison of safety aspects between propellants involves a number of
considerations related to physical and chemical properties of the propel-
lants and physiological effects on humans. Some of these aspects are
compared in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1.
COMPARISON OF SAFETY ASPECTS
ASPECT N204
1. STATE OF LIQUID AT USE ti 50 PSIG EARTH STORABLE
2. EMI RGENCY EXPOSURE LIMIT, 30 (10 MIN. NO2)
PPM
3. OSHA LIMIT, PPM** (5.0 NO2)*
4. THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE*** (5.0 NO2)*
5. BREATHING INDIVIDUAL WILL DAM4GE
HIMSELF UNKNOWINGLY
6. OLFACTORY DETECTION NOT UNTIL EEL
7. PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS DELAYED PULMONARY EDEMA
AT SELF-DETECTION
8. TOXICITY OF REACTION BETTER: NO2 9 NO, N 2 , H2O
PRODUCTS
9. VULNERABILITY IN USE UNINSUL.ATED
10. FIRE CONTROL DIFFICULT
11. EXPLOSION 0.05 TNT/LB
12. SPILL DISPERSAL WORSE
LF2
0 PSIG GRYOGENIC
15 (10 MIN.)
0.1 (QUESTIONABLE)
1.0 (REVISED FROM 0.1)
WILL NOT BREATHE OVER
25 PPM (5 MIN. EEL)
IMMEDIATE AT TLV
MINOR OR NONE
WORSE THAN FOR N 204 ; HF
INSULATED
DIFFICULT
% 0.02 TNT/LB ROM
BETTER
* N204 DISSOCIATES TO NO2 IN THE ATMOSPHERE
** 8 HOUR WORK DAY
*** REFERENCE 1 - THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE FOR REPEATED 8 HOUR WORK DAY
-13-
A major difference in the two oxidizers is that fluorine is only
liquid at cryogenic temperatures. This requires that cooling must be
supplied, such as by liquid nitrogen, except for relatively brief periods
determined by the thickness and efficiency of the tank insulation.
Both propellants are toxic, but can be detected by smell. Detection
of N204 occurs only at a much higher concentration, however, and a person
can fail to detect harmful concentrations. Work area concentrations
allowed by law under the Occupational Safety and Health Act* are much lower
for fluorine than for N204.
Toxicity of fluorine on the applicable basis of ten minute Emergency
Exposure Limits, EEL, is 15 ppm versus 30** for N 204 a ratio of 2:1.
Inhalation by personnel of a much higher concentration of fluorine than
the EEL is considered impossible because its stifling effect is so severe
that choking and asphyxia would result if relief or escape were delayed.
At comparably toxic levels with N 204 a person is less aware of the danger
and may collapse the next day from a delayed pulmonary edema.
Under conditions of reaction of the oxidizers with other materials,
such as fuels or water, N 204 decomposes to form the less toxic substances
NO2 and NO. It reacts with water to form nitric acid and with carbon to
form carbon dioxide or carbon monoxide. Fluorine reacts with water to
form the somewhat less toxic HF and with carbon to form inert CF 4.
Reaction with carbon (charcoal) can be used to dispose of LF2.
In case of a fluorine spill, ambient heat can turn the liquid to
vapor in a matter of one to ten minutes. For a spill of N 204
 a somewhat
longer release time would be involved although N 204 boils at a relatively
low 21°C (700F). ''he dispersal of spilled LF2
 is :considered to be some-
what better because of the lower molecular weight of fluorine as compared
to N204 , NO2 and HNO 3
 and because reaction with atmospheric mo;sture
*Safety and Health Standards Section 1900-1000 Subpart Z, Table 2-1 as of
May 1975. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
**Parts per million
i
-14-
tends to produce heat in the cloud which encourages vertical dispersion.
Spill tests with LF2 were conducted at AFRPL in quantities of approxi-
mately 1000 lbs. Data from these tests can be used as a rough guide in
formulating distances for personnel concentrations during propellant
flowing and handling in this application.
Both propellants are hypergolic with amine (hydrazine based) fuels.
Fluorine, however, is also hypergolic with many other fuels, and even
reacts vigorously with water producing hydrofluoric acid, oxygen, and
steam. Fire control is thus difficult, as it is with other strong
oxidizers.
Explosive hazard estimation involves .ertain assumptions and depends
on the fuel available, but because of the somewhat greater reactivity of
fluorine, its explosive potential is considered less than N 204 because it
is more difficult to achieve a concentrated mixture of reactants.
-15-
4. EFFECT OF FLUORINE AS COMPARED TO N 204 ON KSC OPERATIONS
4.1 Spacecraft Processing Options
Many processing options were considered to determine how the empty
spacecraft propulsion system should be loaded with oxidizer and how the
installation into the Space Shuttle should be accomplished.
The two loading alternatives considered were:
1. Loading of the spacecraft tanks remotely from the pad.
2. Loading of the spacecraft tanks at the pad.
Remote loading was clearly indicated.
The other main consideration was whether the spacecraft should be
installed into the Shuttle Orbiter in the normal payload processing loca-
tion at the Orbiter Processing Facility, or via the Pa 1 '-__a Changeout
Room at the pad.
Other variations of integration sequence w h the IUS or Space Tug
were also considered. As for comparisons between the two oxidizers, there
is no basic difference in the recommended processing sequences for LF2
and N204 except as noted later.
The recommended sequence was based on the following criteria:
1. For safety of KSC personnel and the Shuttle, spacecraft propel-
lant should be loaded remotely from the pad.
2. Mating of the spacecraft with the IUS/Tug should be done either
in the Shuttle Orbiter Bay or in the Payload Changeout Room to
avoid transporting spacecraft propellant through the OPF and VAB.
3. In order to verify form, fit, and function of the interfaces
between the Spacecraft and the IUS/Tug and the Spacecraft and
the Orbiter, a preliminary "dry" mating may be required with the
IUS/Tug and Shuttle or Shuttle simulators. This would be done
early in the schedule of prelaunch operations.
4. The resulting steps are shown in Figure 4-1.
-16-
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The only difference between sequences recommended for LF 2 and that for
N204 1s that liquid fluorine requires cooling from the time of propellant
loading until launch.
In this :o?uence, the Spacecraft is received at t`7e launch site and
checked out to verify that no damage occurred in transportation. Next
it 1c drv` mated with the IUS or Tug in a location such as the Spacecraft
Assembly and Encapsulation Facility to verify compatibility of form, fit
and function of the mechanical and electrical interfaces. Verification
of compatibility with the Shuttle by means of a Shuttle Simulator is also
anticipated. These checks would minimize the chance of a loaded spacecraft
meeting the IUS;Tug o.• Shuttle for the first time at the pad in an incom-
patible condition which could impact the prelaunch schedule and hence
threr En a slip in the launch-readiness date.
Next the spacecraft propulsion is isolated and taken to a remotely
located Oxidizer Dedicated Facility, for example ESA-60 suitably modified.
Propellant loading always, of course, takes place with minimum personnel
exposure.
After an appropriate stabilization period it is recommended that the
loaded propulsion be taken to a "propulsion garage." The propulsion
garage is a remotely located building of simple construction which is
suitable for storage of the propulsion system. The propulsion system is
monitored for leakage or other changes of status.
As the launch readiness date approaches, the loaded propulsion system
and spacecraft are integrated and transported to the Payload ;hangeout
Facility. Depending on the design of the spacecraft and IUS/Tug, inte-
gration of the spe(acraft and IUS or Tug occurs either inside the Shuttle
Cargo Bay or in the Payload Changeoit Room, (option 3 or option 4).
*i.e. empty of propellants
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4.2 Spacecraft Timeline for Pre-launch Operations
Spacecraft timelines for LF2 and N204 are virtually identical except
for a few hours required to disconnect and reconnect N 2 cooling lines when
the propulsion system is moved after loading. A period of thirty days in
the loaded condition is considered appropriate to gain assurance that the
tank is sound.
4.3 Shuttle Timeline for Pre-launch Operations
Shuttle timelines for LF2 and N204 are expected to be the same except
for an additional period for LF 2 spacecraft.not exceeding three hours.
This time period is considered necessary to 11 clear the pad for arrival
of the loaded spacecraft (one hour), 2) clear the pad for reconnection of
LN2 coolant at the Payload Changeout Room (one hour), and 3) clear, the
pad for reconnection of the LN 2 coolant after installation in the Orbiter
(one hour). All of the effects of propellant safety considerations includ-
ing pad clearance times total a maximum of six hours for N 204 and nine
hours for LF2 as shown in Figure 4-2.
POTENTIAL
Figure 4-2. Launch Pad Operations
-19-
5.	 EFFECTS OF FLUORINE AS COMPARED TO N 204 ON KSC FACILITIES -
PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT FACILITY
Effects of fluorine as compared to N 204
 in the design of and acti-
vities in the Payload Changeout Facility are similar to those at the
spacecraft propellant loading site (ESA). The key items are:
1.	 Automatic fluorine-specific vapor detection equipment is recommended.
2.	 Some additional care in evacuating and minimizing personnel during
arrival of the fluorine system and its installation into the Payload
Changeout Room, (e.g. personnel may be evacuated prior to arrival of
the spacecraft). This is due to the somewhat greater toxicity of F2.
3.	 A time allowance for connection of LN2
 cooling to the system after
installation in the Payload Changeout Room.
4.	 Availability of cryogenic LF 2 dewar tank or truck for propellant
drain in case of inability to either continue pre-launch operations
in accordance with the timeline or "back-out" the p-opulsion system,
whether it is in the PCR or Orbiter Bay.
A leak or spill of fluorine or N 204 at the Payload Changeout Facility
would be of much greater consequence than a like incident at the ESA-60
because it would involve more expensive facilities and equipment and
could impact the Shuttle timeline. In order to minimize this possibility
ror either type of oxidizer, the following recommendations are made:
1. Propellant loading to be done remotely.
2. The pad area to be evacuated except for essential personnel during
movement of propellant.
3. A continuous monitoring of safety status to be implemented prior to
propulsion arrival if not previously instituted. This includes
propellant tank temperature, pressure and vapor detection in the PCF.
4. Procedures to be established and practiced to cope with emergencies.
5. Fire control equipment to be available and under control of a well
ti • n:id person,
i
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6.	 EFFECT OF FLUORINE AS COMPARED TO N204
ON ETR FACILITIES
6.1 Spacecraft Explosive Safe Facility
ESA-60 has been successfuly used for loading of Mariner spacecraft
with N 204/MMN and could presumably be modified to accommodate fluorine.
A modified ESA-60 or other oxidizer facility designed to handle fluorine
on an intermittent basis will require, as does the N 20 4
 facility, a
reactivation prior to and deactivation after each launch. All lines and
valves and any tanks should preferably be maintained in a purged, dry and
inert condition to prevent possible corrosion by fluorine in combination
with moisture.
For use with LF2, the following capabilities would be needed for a
modified ESA-60 or other site:
1. Remotely operated fluorine transfer lines for transfer from trailer
truck to spacecraft propellant tanks
2. LN2 cooling equipment and LN 2 dewar
3. Reactors for disposal of fluorine purged from the propellant loading
lines
4. A reactor capable of disposal of one full load of propellant in an
appropriate time interval
5. Propellant vapor detection equipment for personnel protection
6. Propellant drainage channels in the floor of the building to a treat-
ment sump for fluorine disposal
7. Isolation and compartmentation of the fluorine lines to minimize
damage in event of a failure
8. Fire control equipment including tanks for providing water spray or
other appropriate fluid
9. Television coverage in color of the loading area with display in the
remote control center (color to aid in discernment of the nature of
the vapors)
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10. A "propulsion garage" remote from other buildings for storage of the
propulsion system (to attain personnel safety and protect facilities
from corrosion or other damage)
11. Perimeter control of the site during operations to limit access of
personnel to the loading site
12. Recognition of meterological conditions in establishing safe loading
periods (which typically occur daily)
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7.	 EFFECT OF FLUORINE AS COMPARED TO N204
ON SHUTTLE POST LAUNCH OPERATIONS
7.1 Nominal Case
The only effect of fluorine on the Shuttle as compared to N 204 after
a normal mission may be the requirement for purging and sealing of fluorine
dump lines in the event dumping of spacecraft propellant would be required.
It is expected that the requirements for N 204 might be somewhat less
stringent.
7.2 Shuttle Abort Cases
After a Shuttle abort, the effects will depend on the type of abort
and the condition or state of the spacecraft propellant tank and fluorine
dump line (if used). Each abort case is summarized below:
1. Normal complete dump to vacuum (as in abort from orbit) no effects.
2. Dump valve malfunction resulting in a landing while still loaded.
This requires connection of a disposal system to the LF 2 and drainage
of the propulsion system before further Shuttle processing.
3. RTLS abort in atmosphere with suspected fluorine residue either liquid,
solid or gaseous. This requires connection of LN 2 cooling or dis-
posal from the end of the dump line.
4. Return of the Shuttle to an unexpected landing site of opportunity
would require some means for cooling the fluorine or disposing of it
in a safe manner.
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8. EFFECT OF FLUORINE AS COMPARED TO N 204
 ON THE SHUTTLE ORBITER
AND THE.$RUTTLE UPPER STAGE
8.1 Flight Operati_m and Diodes
In normal flight operations, the LF 2/N 2N4
 propulsion system will be
disconnected from ground cooling at T-0. It will have on-board cooling
for 24-36 hours provided by LN 2
 Dewars. The tanks will be unpressur,zed
(1 bar, or 0 psig) from liftoff to deployment of the spacecraft from the
Shuttle Orbiter. Prior to use of the spacecraft a back-off maneuver of
approximately one mile separation between the Shuttle and spacecraft/1JUS
will be accomplished. Only after the back-off maneuver will the space-
craft be pressurized. No operation of the spacecraft propulsion will
occur until 7-21 days after departure of the spacecraft from earth orbit.
Abort modes considered include:
o Return to launch site
o Abort to orbit
o Abort once around
o Abort from orbit
o Landings at landing sites of opportunity
Flight hazards from oxidizers, either N204 or LF2
 would result from:
o Tank leakage
o Tank overpressurization
o Tank damage
o Dump system contamination
o Residual propellants and vapors after flight
In the RTLS, abort hazards could result from either Shuttle caused or
payload caused faults. In order to reduce hazards, secondary leakage
containment and dump lines were considered. Abort to orbit and abort once
around were found to be similar and easier to accommodate as dumping into
vacuum could be accomplished and at a more leisurely pace than during RTLS.
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AFO could involve a longer time for cryogenic propellant to heat up,
however, there is also a longer time to perform propellant dump or payload
jettison procedures.
Landings at sites of opportunity could involve additional risks if
equipment to handle residual F 2
 is not available, however this is a secon-
dary hazard since all oxidizer is assumed normally dumped. There is need
for an additional study of this landing mode.
In order to accommodate the spacecraft propulsion, a number of
effects on the Shuttle Orbiter will be incurred. Most of these are
needed for both N204 and LF2 except for the LN 2 coolant supply.
Affected systems in the Shuttle bay are:
1. Common requirements for N 204 and LF2:
- Dump line (LF 2 requires an F2 passivated line)
Spacecraft relief valve effluent line
Exclusion of combustibles to the extent possible
2. Specific LF2 requirement:
LN 2 coolant supply
For liquid fluorine a special fluorine dump line may be required,
and fluorine oxidizer tank relief lines will be required. A dump line
for the fluorine tank will have to be passivated. It is suggested that
during flight, helium pressure be maintained in the line to insure its
cleanliness.
The effects of possible leakage on the Shuttle Orbiter, if not
sufficiently well inhibited by double wall tanks or by vapor tight shroud
techniques, would be a need to eliminate all materials from the cargo bay
susceptible to ignition by fluorine. This does not appear, however, to
be a practical measure. if the fluorine tank is provided with a double
wall, the possibility of fluorine vapors in the Shuttle bay may be con-
sidered to be reduced to such a low value that vapor containment by the
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spacecraft shroud is not necessary. For the N 204 as the oxidizer, a
vapor tight shroud should be considered. It was beyond the scope of
this study to make final recommendations as to leakage containment
techniques. SUS (IUS or Tug) interfaces are probably the same as the
Shuttle bay interfaces as these functions will probably be routed
through the SUS.
The Shuttle Upper Stage (SUS for this study was designated IUS/Tug)
meaning the Interim Upper Stage or Space Tug, and covers both desig-
nations as appropriate.
Effects on the SUS or IUS/Tug may include:
1. A dump line and disconnect between the spacecraft and the SUS,
and an umbilical fitting at a SUS to Orbiter interface together
with an overboard dump line would be necessary if a spacecraft
dump requirement is imposed.
2. An oxidizer tank relief line appears to be required. It would
be routed from the spacecraft through the SUS and Orbiter inter-
faces as described in (1) above. Figure 8-1 illustrates this
routing.
DUMP LINE CONCEPT
W U_mI %V VL.T
	
. ­.0
Figure 8-1.
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Dumping always occurs at less than 0.1 psi (.007 bar) and can be
into the wake of the Orbiter and it is expected that oxidizers will
either be quickly diluted by the low pressure atmosphere, or will
expand to very low pressures if at orbital altitudes. The Shuttle
vents will be closed at this time but are expected to leak. For this
reason, some very low vapor pressure of oxidizer could theoretically
recirculate into the cargo bay. Although further analysis is suggested
i't appears highly unlikely that a significant concentration of fluorine
could enter the cargo bay via such recirculation.
Cockpit functions will include for Either oxidizer tank, status
monitors for:
- tank pressure
tank temperature (for LF2)
vapor detection
Modifications needed on the exterior of the Shuttle will include dump
ports for the liquids if dump is required and (vapor) relief ports.
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9.	 EFFECTS OF FLUORINE AS COMPAkED TO N204
ON SPACECRAFT PROPULSION SYSTEM DESIGN
9.1 Spacecraft Propulsion Requirements and Technical Base
Substitution of higher energy LF 2/N2H4 for the N 204/MMH propellants
used to Mariner class spacecraft primarily introduces the considerations
related to a cryogenic propellant.
The Shuttle considerations are primarily those of transportation,
since the Shuttle is used to transport this propulsion system in an
inert state.
The spacecraft propulsion system has:
- No operation in the Shuttle
No operation near the Shuttle
Only after deployment and after SUS operation does this system per-
form trajectory corrections and orbit insert 4 ons. These events do not
begin until 7 to 21 days after departure from earth orbit. Thus, no
pressurization of the spacecraft propellant tanks is needed until it is
far from the Shuttle.
Parameters of a typical payload propulsion system are as shown in
Table 9-1.
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Table 9-1.
PAYLOAD PROPULSION SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
LF2/N2H4
PROPELLANT WEIGHT, KG/LB
OXIDIZER	 454/1000 TYPICAL
FUEL	 318/700 TYPICAL
ENGINE THRUST, NEWTONS/LBF
	 2670/600
CHAMBER PRESSURE, N/CM 2//PSIA	 69/100
TANK PRESSURE, N/CM2//PSIA
OPERATING
	
241/350
IN SHUTTLE BAY	 10/14.7
The system resulting from the study is illustrated schematically in
Figure 9-1. It is a four-tank blowdown system featuring propellant
isolation. Figure 9-2 illustrates connections.
r
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PROPULSION SYSTEM
A-Tank Rlnwrinwn
Figure 9-1.
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Table 9-2.
LF2
 Propulsion Hardware Assulytions in the Hazard Analyses
CU
U
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SHUTTLE LALRKM CONFIGIQATION (MODIFIED) SYSTEM
N LF2 N204 ,FzITEM
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latlon Volvo IN docrs	 ire open only.
aeries with burst Contains double redundant
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(biOw-team Is supply supply sure system provided
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tu► lag laeNch
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"Jew propulsion technology available for fluorine propulsion includes
compatibility testing, electron beam welding, fracture mechanics tech-
niques, the AFRPL developed bobbin seal, and a better understanding of
compatibility and passivation.
Materials selections will be based on experience being acquired at
JPL and in the industry on fluorine rocket and corollary high energy com-
bustion devices. JPL has successfully demonstrated a complete self-
contained (but not flight weight) F2/N 2H4 propulsion system.
9.2 Hazard Analysis
A hazard analysis was conducted, and the results derived from it are
largely reflected in the propulsion system design recommendations, dis-
cussed later. The details of the hazard analysis are included in the
basic document, but the assumptions upon which the analysis was based is
presented in Table 2-3 on the last half of the page. The changes in
these assumptions, as a result of the hazard analysis, are shown on the
right half of the Table.
9.3 Spacecraft Propulsion System Design Recommendations
The primary effects of fluorine on spacecraft propulsion system
design are to require tank insulation, ground cooling and relief line
provisions, and fluorine compatible materials. Propulsion system design
criteria which may be considered as recommended criLeria for fluorine
and good practice for N 204 include:
1. System design should preclude significant pressure in the tankage
during transportation from the loading site to the pad and during
transportation in the Shuttle. The fluorine tank should be pres-
surized only after the SUS is deployed from the Shuttle Orbiter.
2. Fluorine (and probably N 204 ) should be isolated in its tank by
closed isolation valve mounted as close to the tank as practical.
This state would be maintained until after Tug deployment from the
Shuttle Orbiter.
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3. Plumbing systems upstream and downstream from the isolation valves
to the next valve should be passivated to provide a fail-safe re-
dundant propellant containment.
4. Double wall tankage should be considered for LF2.
5. All associated equipment and procedures of the LF2 system should
be fail-fail-safe, or at least fail-safe.
6. Fail-safe operations are needed during propellant loadin,.
7. A leakage detector sensor is desirable between the walls if a double
wall tank is used.
8. Caution and warning instrumentation should be provided and monitored
during propellant loading, storage, transport to the pad, instal-
lation in the orbiter, in flight and during SUS deployment in orbit.
Temperature, pressure and leakage information is required. Pressure
transducers should have double redundant propellant containment.
9. In the spacecraft both types of oxidizer tanks would be relatively
well protected from inadvertent mechanical damage. The LF 2 tank
would have external insulation to the extent of approximately two
to three inches of closed cell PBI foam. In addition, the LF 2
 tank
could incorporate a double wall. N204 tanks would be covered with
multi,-layer insulation.
10. Cummand signals to the spacecraft propulsion should be inhibited
until the deployment in orbit away from the Shuttle.
11. It is desirable to have a vapor tight shroud (shroud concepts are
shown in Figure 9-3.
12. It is desirable for cargo bay components to be metal, dense ceramics,
and fully fluorinated elastomers.
13. Crew air intake (if any) should be effectively separated from propel-
lant vent ports.
14. Combustible vapors and projectiles from other systems in cargo bay
should be prevented.
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10. SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR LF 2 AS COMPARED TO N204
Safety guidelines for LF 2 as compared to those for N 204 in the Space
Shuttle context were found to be similar, and the fluorine guidelines
almost without exception include those for N204.
Significant differences relate to the somewoat different physical and
chemical properties of these oxidizers. These .i fferences come mainly
from the cryogenic nature of liquid fluorine, the need for passiviation of
materials in contact with it, its hypergolicit^ with materials not ignited
as rapidly by N204 , and its somewhat lower ::xposure limits under emergency
and normal working conditions.
General fluorine safety guidelines are enumerated below, and cover
all the activities of concern: system design, ground operations, and flight
operations including abort for either propellant (the usual guidelines
for propellant handling also apply):
1. Fail-safe tank cooling capability must be provided from loading
through launch.
2. Adequate tank cooling must be provided during normal Shuttle flight
and under emergency or Shuttle abort conditions. This may require
an LN 2 cooling system in the orbiter.
3. Passivation of system hardware must be obtained including any redun-
dant containers. Passivation should be protected from mechanical
damage and from impurities in the fluorine, such as water which
could yield hydrofluoric acid or other corrosive species.
4. Hardware for use with liquid fluorine must be of fluorine specific
design and fabricated to high standards with emphasis on designs
which will not lose passivation.
5. Materials surrounding a fluorine tank should, to the degree possible,
be metallic materials, dense ceramics or fully fluorinated (e.g.
Teflon), to minimize reaction with fluorine in case of a leak.
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6. Personnel activities conducted near fluorine should be kept to a
minimum, and loading operations should be conducted remotely.
Although the exposure of personnel during normal operations tends
to be low because of the infrequent nature of fluorine spacecraft
launches, precautions must be observed to prevent threshold limit
values (daily working limits) from being exceeded. Means to pre-
vent exceeding Emergency Exposure Limits require protective suit-
ing to be worn whenever leakages are even remotely possible, anu
isolation of unprotected personnel by suitable distances from
possible spill.
7. Adequate personnel training and periodic practice of emergency
procedures with fluorine are needed.
Figure 9-1 showed schematically a system which incorporates the
desired features including propellant isolation. Figure 9-2 illustrated
features of the double wall tank concept that could be used consistent
with this system schematic.
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11-
	 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
11.1 Conclusions
As a result of this study, a number of conclusions can be drawn
about design criteria and requirements, and ground and flight procedures
necessary to maximize the chance of safe and successful transport of a
spacecraft fluorine propulsion system in the Space Shuttle. These con-
clusions are:
• The chance of an incident (hazard) occurring is reduced by isolat-
ing the LF2 in the tank and not allowing any fluorine in valves or
piping during handling of the loaded system on the ground or during
the Shuttle phase of the flight.
•	 Current techniques for handling fluorine in commercial applications
and at rocket test sites appear applicable, with refinements, to
loading fluorine in payloads for Shuttle.
•	 Propellant should be loaded into the spacecraft at a remote location.
The propulsion system should be monitored and allowed to stabilize
prior to transporting and installing the spacecraft into the Shuttle.
•	 Use of an oxidizer dump system for LF 2 during flight appears tech-
nically feasible, but the entire dump question requires further
investigation.
• Risk to personnel is best reduced by excluding people from proximity
to toxic materials during the processing, and by providing effective
protective clothing and by instituting careful "back-out" procedures.
•	 In order to achieve the required level of safety with fluorine some
additional Shuttle pre-launch operations time, in the order of a few
hours, may be needed.
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t•	 The safety effort required to control hazards to protect equipment,
facilities and personnel is significant and may be justifiably
higher than for previous, unmanned spacecraft. It is expected,
however, that safety related costs will be a fraction of propulsion
costs.
•	 The safety program for fluorine should be started and implemented
during the hardware development phase, should be oriented towards
specific goals and should incorporate the System Safety Engineering
approach throughout the program.
•	 A safety assurance function in cooperation with the quality control
function must be provided to assure that all safety requirements
are met when the payload is installed into the Orbiter.
•	 The effects of residual hazards during flight in the Space Shuttle
Orbiter Cargo bay from properly isolated propellants in a propulsion
system which has been loaded and stored prior to transportation on
the Shuttle appear low and the number of residual hazards appear few
provided that hazards to the propulsion system from other systems
are minimized.
• Transportation of the system should be in the unpressurized (or
nearly unpressurized) state to minimize the effects of any leaks
(ICC regulations limit transportation on highways to 300 psi).
•	 The concept of a "propulsion garage" at the launch complex for safe
storage of the loaded propulsion system during the verification
period after loading and prior to launch is suggested.
•	 The use of double (redundant) wall'pressure vessels for oxidizer
containment is suggested
•	 Propellant vapor detection in the void between shells is suggested.
•	 Use of inert gas in fluorine dump lines to protect the passivation
and to provide. verification of dump line integrity (if dump pro-
visions are required) is suggested.
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11.2 Recommendations
Additional system safety engineering and propulsion system design
engineering efforts are recommended as indicated below. Close coordination
with the Shuttle Orbiter and Tug designers will be required as it was
during the execution of this study.
1. A more complete definition of the implications of and need for a
propellant dump system for fluorine considering the actual technology
available for such a system and more complete definition of the
impacts to the Shuttle Orbiter design. This should include a) dump
valve and line design, b) reliability considerations and c) a safety
comparison (,dump versus no dump).
2. Propellant tank design and demonstration act! ,iity to demonstrate the
feasibility of flightweight, long term fluorine containment in a
redundant wall tank.
3. Advanced development of long-life, leak-tight propellant isolation
valves in the 1 to 2 inch line size which will allow propellant to
be dumped within the allowable time constraint (if dump is required).
4. Continued definition of the propulsion system, including shroud
and line routings especially for the coolant (and dump lines, if
required).
5. Technology work on the propulsion system which will allow fully
realistic design layouts to be made.
6. Advanced development of LF 2 and N20 4 vapor detection equipment.
7. A study of the requirements for equipment to accomplish safe
landings and aborts to landing sites of opportunity.
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